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Abstract
In this paper we look at ﬁxed-term contracts and examine the main features of temporary
as opposed to regular employment, keeping the focus on employment careers and wage
dynamics of workers employed under ﬁxed-term contracts. Previous work found that ﬁxed-
term contracts serve as screening devices for employers. Here it is found that ﬁxed-term
contracts serve as search devices for workers, as well. Hence, they can be considered stepping-
stones to permanent forms of employment. However, if due to a job loss episode, a worker
receives at some evolved stage of his or her career a ﬁxed-term contract, there is an indication
that both his wage and subsequent employment prospects are severely harmed.
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Typically, ﬁxed-term contracts give employers the opportunity to layoﬀ workers at
lower cost and with fewer restrictions than is the case for regular workers. These
two features are expected to make ﬁxed-term contracts a useful option for em-
ployers, particularly in labor markets where the costs of terminating a permanent
contract are high.
As such, ﬁxed-term contracts become a component of labor market ﬂexibility,
one that seems particularly appropriate to adjust the level of the workforce to
ﬂuctuations of labor supply and demand, expected or not. Consistently, many
European governments have tried to reform the labor market, leaving existing
contracts unchanged but reducing (or eliminating) ﬁring restrictions on new con-
tracts.
The focus on the ﬂexibility role of ﬁxed-term contracts has fueled a debate
about the quality of jobs and the opportunities for career advancement oﬀered
to temporary workers. The concern is that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts are
used as buﬀer stocks, insulating permanent workers from ﬂuctuations in labor
demand. Should this be the case, temporary jobs should be expected to result in
job loss, workers should suﬀer from poor job security and receive little training,
which would further harm their prospects of subsequently ﬁnding a better job.
Another consequence of using ﬁxed-term contracts to avoid higher prospective
ﬁring costs is that employment adjustment to shocks should be speeded up. How-
ever, in a study of the speed of employment adjustment in German manufacturing
over a period of 15 years, Hunt (2000) found no evidence that the 1985 law aimed
at facilitating the use of ﬁxed-term contracts resulted in faster adjustment. Re-
strictions on rolling over ﬁxed-term contracts were identiﬁed as one of the reasons
behind this puzzling result.
The fact that ﬁxed-term contracts cannot live forever and must be, at some
point, either made permanent or terminated, severely reduces the usefulness of
their availability as an instrument of ﬂexibility. Restrictive roll-over clauses may,
however, create an extra reason to use ﬁxed-term contracts. Churning, i.e., match
replacement at continuing positions, may be the employers optimal response to
the prohibition of contract roll-over, although being an unintended result of those
1restrictions (Varej˜ ao, 2000, Blanchard and Landier, 2001). If, at the end of a
given duration, the employer decides to keep a temporary worker, his contract
becomes permanent and subject to regular ﬁring costs. To avoid this consequence,
the employer has an incentive to destroy this (otherwise) good match and hire a
replacement match of an uncertain value. The result is unproductive churning. If
such use of ﬁxed-term contracts dominates, workers, especially those entering the
labor market, will have to go through a succession of low productivity temporary
jobs and many spells of unemployment, before obtaining a regular job.
However, ﬁxed-term contracts may also serve in a third role. In high ﬁring cost
settings, investments in pre-hiring screening are the employers optimal response to
the costs of having bad regular matches terminated. The availability of low ﬁring
cost contracts changes the preferred mix of pre-hiring and on-the-job screening,
increasing the demand for the latter. With ﬁxed-term contracts, employers have
the incentive to hire workers for a trial period, observe them on the job, gaining
information about the true value of the match, and only then make the decision
about keeping him on or laying him oﬀ, holding the option of a low-cost dismissal
throughout.
If ﬁxed-term contracts are used as screening devices, for workers they act as
stepping-stones to regular positions. By deﬁnition, not all newly formed matches
will survive and become regular matches. Some will not meet the employers reser-
vation match value and will end up as layoﬀs followed by replacement hirings.
Others will not oﬀer the workers utility reservation level and will end up as quits.
Others, still, will be successful matches and will result in the ﬁxed-term contract
being converted into a regular contract. As a result, the productivity value of
the surviving matches is enhanced and employment relationships are more stable,
both facts fostering investments in human capital and productivity growth.
The consequences of ﬁxed-term contracts in terms of the employment and wage
dynamics of workers, as well as the corresponding policy implications, are closely
related to the objectives of the employers staﬃng policies. In a companion paper
(Varej˜ ao and Portugal, 2002), we found evidence of ﬁxed-term contracts being used
in the Portuguese labor market mostly for the purpose of screening workers for
regular positions.1 In this paper, we look at the workers side and, after establishing
1Results supporting the importance of screening as a motivation for the use of ﬁxed-term contracts were also
obtained by Adam and Canziani (1998), Booth et al. (2000), and Guell-Rotlan and Petrongolo (2000).
2the proﬁle of the typical temporary worker, we examine the impact of ﬁxed-term
contracts on wage proﬁles of temporary and regular workers, and at patterns of
transitions across labor market states.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional frame-
work. In Section 3 the dataset used in empirical work is described. Section 4
describes the most salient features of ﬁxed-term employment in Portugal, while
Section 5 compares wages of temporary and regular workers, and Section 6 looks
at transitions across labor market states. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional framework
Rules governing the termination of permanent contracts in Portugal are widely
perceived as very restrictive, placing the country high in all international rankings
of labor market rigidities (e.g., OECD, 1999). Fixed-term contracts, which were
ﬁrst regulated in 1976, were conceived as an instrument of ﬂexibilization at the
margin. The mushrooming of these contracts eventually led to major changes in
the legal framework governing both regular (permanent) and ﬁxed-term contracts
in 1989, when most rules currently in force were established.
As a result, ﬁxed-term contracts are permitted for objective reasons (replace-
ment of temporarily absent permanent workers, exceptional workload, seasonal
work, and speciﬁc projects). They are also permitted for business start-ups, the
launching of new activities of uncertain duration, and recruiting long-term unem-
ployed workers and ﬁrst-time job seekers.
Fixed-term contracts have a minimum duration of six months unless they are
justiﬁed on objective grounds, in which case no minimum applies. Their maxi-
mum duration is set at three years (two in the cases of business start-ups and the
launching of new activities). Three successive renewals is the maximum permitted.
The contract expires only if the employer notiﬁes the worker eight days in
advance that he does not intend to renew it; otherwise it is automatically renewed.
If the maximum duration of the contract is exceeded, the contract automatically
becomes permanent.
When the end of a temporary contract is reached and the worker is not oﬀered
a regular position, he or she becomes entitled to a terminal bonus equal to two
days pay for each complete month of service.
3If the employer terminates the contract before its term, and the termination
is unlawful, the worker is entitled to compensation equal to the pay loss from
dismissal to the date of the court’s decision or the term of the contract (whichever
occurs ﬁrst). He or she is also entitled to reinstatement if the term of the contract
has not yet been reached.
If, during the period of the contract a vacancy for a permanent position opens
at the ﬁrm, employees with ﬁxed-term contracts at that moment who may qualify
for the job are given priority over other applicants.
Contracts surviving for 12 months that are terminated for reasons not at-
tributable to the worker cannot be replaced within a period of three months.
Hence, ﬁxed-term contracts oﬀer Portuguese employers the opportunity of hir-
ing new workers on a much less stringent basis than regular contracts. However,
ﬁxed-term contracts are also subject to a number of restrictions that may limit
their practical usefulness. As mentioned above, clauses prohibiting the roll-over of
contracts may give rise to unproductive churning, but the prohibition of replace-
ment of temporary workers that stay with the ﬁrm for one year actually makes
churning a less interesting option.
3D a t a
The Household Employment Survey is a quarterly employment survey run by the
Instituto Nacional de Estat´ istica, (INE). In every quarter it randomly surveys
approximately 40,000 individuals. One sixth of the sample is rotated out every
quarter. Seven spells of the survey, from the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 to the third of
2000, were available to this study, covering 56,140 individuals.
Individual identiﬁcation numbers permit the tracking of individuals over consec-
utive spells of the survey (5/6 from quarter to quarter). This makes computation
of quarterly transition rates across labor market states (employment, unemploy-
ment, and not in the labor force) possible. Because information on the type of
contract held by the employed is available, it is possible to compare the pattern
of transitions for workers on ﬁxed-term and open-ended contracts. The survey
also contains detailed information on the individuals demographic characteristics,
his or her labor market background, current job characteristics, current wage, and
job-search eﬀorts. This allows for a full characterization of the temporary work-
4force and extensive control for other relevant job and workers’ characteristics in
regression analysis.
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Between 1991 and 1998, ﬁxed-term contracts represented an average of 14 percent
of total employment (Figure 1 - A), but an average of 62 percent of all accessions
and 43 percent of all separations (Figure 1, panels C and D).
Figure 1: Proportion of Fixed-Term Contracts on Total Employment and Worker
Flows.
That the importance of ﬁxed-term contracts is under-evaluated by point-in-time
stock counts is conﬁrmed by comparing the number of workers with a ﬁxed-term
contract at the end of each calendar year with the number of those that, at any
point within the year, were employed with those contracts. For ﬁrms with at least
5100 employees, point-in-time measures capture only 54 percent of the total number
of individuals with ﬁxed-term contracts at any point within the period (source:
Social Audit).2
Across plants there is an enormous diversity in the intensity of use of temporary
workers in total employment. The distribution of the share of temporary employ-
ment has a large mass point at zero that represents 75 percent of all establishments.
However, for the remaining 25 percent, the intensity of use of temporary workers
spans the entire range. Nearly 2 percent of the establishments, presumably newly
created establishments, employ temporary workers only. Excluding units that do
not employ temporary workers, the mode of the distribution occurs in the interval
corresponding to 15 to 20 percent of total employment (source: Establishment
Employment Survey, establishments of all sizes, in all sectors considered).
The incidence of ﬁxed-term contracts varies dramatically across occupational
categories. Temporary contracts account for only 4 percent of total employment of
Managers, but this share varies inversely with the skill-level, reaching 68 percent
for apprentices at the lower-end of the scale.3 This pattern of variation of the
incidence of ﬁxed-term contracts across skill-levels indicates that ﬁrms use staﬃng
policies that diﬀer enormously across occupational categories. At the top of the
occupational scale, workers are either recruited as permanent or they are oﬀered an
open-ended contract after a short trial period. For lower skill levels, individuals are
predominantly hired under ﬁxed-term contracts, which, on average, have longer
duration.
Workers with ﬁxed-term contracts are predominantly women (54.1 percent of
total employment with ﬁxed-term contracts) and are younger and better educated
than workers with open-ended contracts (Table 1). The average age of workers
with ﬁxed-term contracts is 30.5 years (38.8 for permanent workers) and their
average number of years of education is 8.2 (7.2 for permanent workers). The
higher educational attainment of temporary workers is not independent of the fact
that they are younger, because the nine years mandatory schooling is still recent
2A similar result was also obtained for the U.S. labor market (Houseman, 2001). There is, however, a diﬀer-
ence of degree. Where Houseman reports a ﬁve-to-one relationship between the point-in-time and accumulated
stock counts of short-term hirings for the U.S., here a two-to-one relationship was obtained. Even though the
two contractual arrangements are not strictly comparable, this suggests a longer average duration of temporary
contracts in Portugal (about six months).
3All these ﬁgures are from the Social Audit and refer to ﬁrms with at least 100 employees. In this dataset,
ﬁxed-term contracts represent 17.2 percent of total employment (which exceeds the 14 percent average in Figure
1).
6in Portugal.
Fixed-term contract Open-ended contract All
By Gender
Male 45.9 54.7 53.6
Female 54.1 45.3 46.4
By Age Group
16-20 14.8 4.3 5.6
21-35 57.2 36.7 39.4
36-55 25.5 50.3 47.1
>55 2.5 8.7 7.9
By School Level
<4y e a r s 3.7 5.2 5.1
4y e a r s 49.4 59.0 57.7
9y e a r s 21.1 14.6 15.4
12 years 15.4 11.8 12.3
Technical School 2.4 3.3 3.2
College 8.0 6.1 6.3
Table 1: Structure of total employment, by type of contract and individual at-
tributes (percentage).
5W a g e P r o ﬁ l e s
Raw diﬀerences between monthly wages of temporary and permanent workers in-
dicate that ﬁxed-term contracts are clearly associated with lower pay - the average
hourly wage of employees with ﬁxed-term contracts is 82.6 percent of the corre-
sponding measure for employees with open-ended contracts.
To fully control for the individual observed characteristics of both the worker
and the employer, Mincerian-type wage equations for workers on ﬁxed-term and
7open-ended contracts were estimated. The set of regressors includes human capital
variables (age, schooling and vocational training), two dummies indicating if the
worker is in his ﬁrst job and if he is on a part-time job, and controls for the type
of employer (public administration, state-owned company and other). A dummy
variable indicating the type of contract the individual has (ﬁxed-term or open-
ended) is added, multiplied by the age variable (49*2 coeﬃcients, corresponding
to ages between 16 and 64 and the two contract types). The dependent variable is
the log of the monthly wage. For our purpose it is essential to compare the wages
received by workers with temporary and permanent contracts at diﬀerent points
of their working lives. To do that we represent in ﬁgure 2 the estimated log of the
montly wage corresponding to each type of contract-age pair. Two third-degree
polynomial regression curves were added to the ﬁgure.
Figure 2: Age-earnings profile, by type of contract.
The ﬁgure shows that both curves have the usual shape. Workers in the early
years of their carreers receive similar pay, independently of the type of contract
they have. If anything, workers with ﬁxed-term contracts receive slightly higher
wages than similar workers with open-ended contracts, which could indicate the
8presence of a compensating diﬀerential for reduced job security associated with
temporary contracts. However, the situation is completely reversed as we look at
older workers - at the age of 30, the penalty is about 10 percent the wage received
by a permanent worker. The gap grows wider with the workers age, reaching 20
percent for workers aged 50.
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6.1 Empirical Transition Rates
If ﬁrms use ﬁxed-term contracts predominantly for screening, for workers these
contracts are stepping-stones to a permanent form of employment. At the same
time, if ﬁxed-term contracts are used for churning or to deal with workload ﬂuc-
tuations they are a transitory form of employment with poor prospects of career
advancement.
Employment by ﬁxed-term contract is a transient state by design. Several
destination states are admissible. Here we consider transitions out of temporary
employment into unemployment, inactivity and other job, as well as transitions
from temporary to permanent positions with the same employer. As a benchmark,
the corresponding transition rates originating in regular employment were also
computed. Results are in Table 2. 4
To Unemployment To Inactivity To Another Job To an OEC To an FTC
From OEC (1) 0.36 0.78 0.75 0.32
From FTC (2) 3.21 3.08 3.36 5.05
(2)/(1) 8.9 3.9 4.5
Table 2: Quarterly Transition Rates from Employment, by Type of Contract
(Percentage).
Transitions out of employment are less frequent in Portugal than in other coun-
tries.5 However, because of the very nature of those contracts, we expect that
workers with ﬁxed-term contracts change their status more frequently, which is
4Spanning from the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 to the third quarter of 2000, the sample period covers an upturn only.
This could, of course, inﬂuence the results reported here. However, a comparison with similar evidence for the
1992-1997 period (Portugal, 2000), is reassuring. Except for transitions to unemployment, which are, as expected,
higher (0.61 and 4.70 for open-ended contracts and ﬁxed-term contracts), the magnitude of transition rates is
remarkably similar for the two periods. More important, for all types of transitions, the diﬀerential between the
two types of contract is about the same in the two periods.
5Blanchard and Portugal (2001) estimate that the magnitude of worker ﬂows out of employment for Portugal
is about one fourth of the corresponding ﬁgure for the United States.
9exactly what we see in Table 2. Workers with ﬁxed-term contracts are about ﬁve
times as likely to lose their jobs, and nine times as likely to become unemployed
as are workers on open-ended contracts. This is, of course, what one could ex-
pect whatever the reasons ﬁrms use ﬁxed-term contracts. The second point is
that about 5.1 percent of all workers on a ﬁxed-term contract are likely to be
given an open-ended contract every quarter. This is suggestive of the importance
of screening as a motivation for oﬀering ﬁxed-term contracts to newly admitted
workers.
6.2 Estimation Procedure
Duration analysis provides a convenient statistical framework to study worker
ﬂows. The estimation of the hazard function, as applied to the context of job
duration, starts with the deﬁnition of the duration variable (t) that measures the
workers’ tenure in the job. All workers are observed over a ﬁxed time interval of
one quarter.
A useful concept in statistical analysis of a duration phenomenon is the hazard
function. In the study of job duration, the hazard function gives the instantaneous
probability moving out of a job (or ending a ﬁxed-term contract) at t,g i v e nt h a t
he stayed in the job (or with a ﬁxed-term contract) until t
h(t) = lim
∆t→0









where f(t) is the probability density function, F(t) is the distribution function,


















     
     
θ1, if 0 ≤ t ≤ 6,
θ2, if 6 <t≤ 12,
θ3, if 12 <t≤ 24,
θ4, if 24 <t≤ 36,
θ5, if 36 <t<∞
(4)
In this paper we shall also distinguish between three exit modes from de job (un-
employment, inactivity, and other job) and three destinations out of the ﬁxed-term
contract regime(permanent contract, other ﬁxed-term job, and non-employment).
Thus, we deﬁne cause-speciﬁc hazard functions to destination j
h(t)r = lim
∆t→0
(P(t ≤ T<t+∆ t,R = r | T ≥ t)
∆t
(5)










The model has a conventional competing risks interpretation. In this frame-
work, a latent duration (Tj) attaches to each exit mode. We only observe the
minimum of each latent variable. If risks are assumed to be independent, with
continuous duration, this model simpliﬁes to three separate single-cause hazard
models. The same simpliﬁcation can be obtained if we assume that transitions
can solely occur at the limits of the intervals, which, for the sake of simplicity, we
will do.
A common way to accommodate the presence of observed individual hetero-
geneity is to specify a proportional hazards model
h(t | x)=h0j(t)exp(x
 βj)( 8 )
where h0j(t) denotes the baseline speciﬁc hazard function, that is, the hazard func-
tion corresponding to zero values for the covariates x. In this case, the covariates
aﬀect the hazard function proportionally (i.e.
dh(x)
dxk = βkh(x) ). An implication of
11this assumption is that the impact of the covariates does not change (in relative
terms) with the progression of the spell of inaction.
Our information on the elapsed duration is grouped into quarterly intervals
(while transitions can only be identiﬁed over a ﬁxed interval of one quarter). Let
M = m denote the occurrence of an exit in a given month [ct−1,c t], where m is
the realization of a discrete random job duration variable M ∈ (1,...,K). The
probability that an event occurs in the mth interval (i.e. that an exit occurs over
the course of the 3-month window), and that such an exit is to destination r,
will be given (neglecting, for the sake of parsimony, the t and x variables) by the
complementary log-log function
hj(m | x)=1− exp[−exp(λmj + x
 βj)] (9)
where λt condenses the value of the cumulative hazard function over the interval
m.













where and δmj is an indicator that assumes the value 1 if the individual exits to
destination j during the mth interval, and 0 otherwise. Finally, since individual
observations can be repeated (up to six times) the model has to accommodate the
presence of individual-speciﬁc error terms.
6.3 Estimation Results
The dataset used covers ten potential transitions (eleven quarters). Overall, it
contains 98,325 observations, 13.0 percent of which (12,847) correspond to workers
with ﬁxed-term contracts.
12E-U E-I E-E’
estimate std error estimate std error estimate std error
Sex -0.1687** 0.0783 -0.4738* 0.0663 0.3629* 0.0649
Training 0.2651** 0.1212 0.0501 0.1202 0.0504 0.1074
Schooling -0.0009 0.0121 -0.0550* 0.0105 0.0123 0.0098
First Job 0.0426 0.1329 0.5181* 0.0982 -0.4471* 0.1018
Experience 0.0029 0.0039 0.0244* 0.0030 -0.0280* 0.0036
Left because
Dismissal 0.2127*** 0.1260 -0.2991* 0.1065 -0.0858 0.1037
End FTC 0.4323* 0.1166 -0.0032 0.1010 0.0608 0.0988
Quit 0.0155 0.1330 -0.2094** 0.1058 0.0745 0.0953
Type of employer
Public Adm. -0.2364*** 0.1253 -0.0661 0.0977 -0.6690* 0.1269
Public Firm -0.3133*** 0.1855 0.1545 0.1217 -0.4559* 0.1636
Hourly Wage (log) -0.5049* 0.1189 -0.1525 0.0928 -0.4490* 0.1523
Baseline-hazard
Open-ended Contracts
λ1 0.0352 0.8607 -2.0740* 0.6746 0.3491 0.6943
λ2 -0.6532 0.8664 -2.7707* 0.6800 0.0209 0.6953
λ3 -0.8581 0.8625 -2.8962* 0.6727 -0.3890 0.6952
λ4 -1.0775 0.8704 -3.0804* 0.6781 -0.8153 0.7035
λ5 -2.2101** 0.8746 -3.7878* 0.6793 -1.3544*** 0.7043
Baseline-hazard
Fixed-Term Contracts
λ1 0.7810 0.8509 -1.4999** 0.6640 0.5299 0.6899
λ2 0.5720 0.8533 -1.6094** 0.6642 0.4651 0.6915
λ3 0.0295 0.8587 -2.3958* 0.6721 0.0561 0.6966
λ4 -0.3520 0.8825 -2.3391* 0.6892 -0.1213 0.7166
λ5 -0.2717 0.8867 -2.9043* 0.7084 -0.6707 0.7422
N 98325 98325 98325
Log Likelihood -3662.6 -5295.0 -5271.6
Table 3: Transitions Out of Employment. Piecewise-constant hazard model with
random effects. The model also includes 10 time dummies.
13Results in table 3 clearly indicate that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts face
higher probabilities of transition to all the destination states considered, as in-
dicated by the parameters of the baseline hazard functions for open-ended and
temporary contracts. It is also clear that transition rates decline with job dura-
tion.6
Transitions out of employment are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by human capital
variables. Workers with more years of education are less likely to leave their
jobs to become unemployed or inactive, but are more likely to leave for another
job. Tenure also reduces the probability that the worker makes a transition to
unemployment or drops out of the labor force. Longer tenures and higher wages
are also associated with fewer transitions to other jobs (E-E’), which is consistent
w i t ham a t c h i n gi n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
Things are less clear-cut with labor market experience. The positive sign in the
employment to out-of-the-labor force (E-I) equation captures retirements. The
negative sign in the employment-to-employment equation has an obvious match-
ing interpretation - more experienced workers are more likely to have found good
matches and, for that reason, they are less likely to switch jobs voluntarily. How-
ever, a matching interpretation could imply a negative sign in the employment to
unemployment, which is contrary to the result we obtained. The fact that experi-
ence enhances the probability of becoming unemployed could be the result of mass
layoﬀs, associated or not to to plant closings, that imply the termination of good
and bad matches alike (hence, more ﬂows of regular workers into unemployment)
and hit disproportionately more experienced workers. In the three equations, the
type of contract was interacted with tenure.
The results show that the conditional probabilities of making all the transitions
considered decrease with tenure. The slope of the hazard is higher in the case
of workers with the open-ended contracts than it is for workers with open-ended
contracts. For workers with open-ended contracts, the probability of becoming
inactive and of switching jobs is close to its baseline level after 12 months of
tenure.
The focus on the eﬀects of temporary employment episodes on workers’ ca-
reer prospects highlights the importance of looking at transitions originating in
6Note that the baseline hazard function is deﬁned for a benchmark where all covariates take zero values
14temporary employment.
The empirical transition rate from temporary employment to permanent em-
ployment and to unemployment are depicted in ﬁgure Figure 3.
Figure 3: Transition Rates from Fixed-Term Contracts.
Transitions to permanent positions peak at 12 and at 36 months. On the con-
trary, transitions to unemployment are highest for very short durations, although
they have local peaks at twelve and twenty four months. The pattern of transitions
observed corresponds to the one implied by a matching process - bad matches are
quickly undone and good matches become permanent within a short period (12
month), but also as the legal maximum duration of these contracts (36 months for
a number of cases) is reached. Local peaks at 12 and 24 months in transitions to
15unemployment may, however, indicate that these contracts also serve (as they are
expected to) ﬁll temporary positions and are therefore terminated at their terminal
date.
To analyse further this issue, transitions orignating in temporary positions were
studied in the context of multivariate analysis. Three destination states were
considered - from temporary position to a permanent one with the same employer
(FTC-OEC in table 4), from one temporary position to another temporary position
with a diﬀerent employer (FTC-FTC’), and from one temporary position to non-
employment (FTC-NE).
The equation for transitions from ﬁxed-term to open-ended contracts highlights
the role of some human capital variables. Workers with more schooling, training
and longer tenures (up to 36 months), but not with more experience, are more
likely to receive a permanent contract.
Wages are inversely related to the probability of moving from a ﬁxed-term to an
open-ended contract, which means that there is a wage diﬀerential compensating
workers for job insecurity, but not necessarily for having one ﬁxed-term contract.
Wages are also inversely related to the probability of moving another temporary
job or to non-employment.
The shape of the baseline hazard function on transitions to permanent em-
ployment conﬁrms the results already mentioned - bad temporary matches are
quickly undone, but those surviving for longer periods are more likely to become
permanent.
Less experienced workers are more likely to engage in on-thejob search and,
therefore, switch jobs. Controlling for the same workers characteristics as before,
as well as for other relevant factors (such as part-time status, work at unusual
hours, and overeducation), having a ﬁxed-term contract signiﬁcantly raises the
probability that the worker searches for another job (Table 5). This indicates
that ﬁxed-term contracts are search devices also for workers. Their advantage
as such is that they permit searching for the adequate match while employed,
thereby reducing the costs of search, with the likely additional advantage of giving
workers (especially those with reduced labor market experience) access to better
wage distributions (Connolly and Gottschalk, 2001).
In the on-the job search equation, schooling, vocational training and overeduca-
16FTC-OEC FTC-FTC’ FTC-NE
estimate std error estimate std error estimate std error
Sex 0.2636* 0.0815 0.1090 0.1199 -0.4466* 0.0761
Training 0.0719 0.1292 -0.0523 0.1917 0.2080** 0.1149
Schooling 0.0328* 0.0119 0.0331** 0.0176 -0.0469* 0.0112
First Job -0.1973 0.1388 -0.2739 0.2051 0.4786* 0.1297
Experience -0.0076*** 0.0045 -0.0210* 0.0072 0.0062 0.0038
Left because
Dismissal 0.1393 0.1352 -0.0909 0.2181 -0.0175 0.1324
End FTC 0.0086 0.1258 0.1709 0.1766 0.3306* 0.1097
Quit 0.1925 0.1331 -0.0334 0.2107 -0.0517 0.1398
Type of employer
Public Adm. -0.4502* 0.1273 -0.4888** 0.2027 0.1125 0.0992
Public Firm -0.3678** 0.1791 -0.1166 0.2505 -0.0001 0.1507
Hourly Wage (log) -0.2109** 0.1037 -0.3086 0.1713 -0.1926*** 0.1105
Baseline-hazard
λ1 -2.3979* 0.8086 -0.9154 1.2294 -0.3897 0.7311
λ2 -1.7868** 0.8085 -1.0156 1.2332 -0.5603 0.7329
λ3 -1.6655** 0.8102 -1.5358 1.2399 -1.1990 0.7365
λ4 -1.1507*** 0.8171 -1.5777 1.2574 -1.3871*** 0.7496
λ5 -1.3755*** 0.8265 -2.7941** 1.3170 -1.6685** 0.7604
N 19298 12928 12928
Log Likelihood -2525.5 -1370.4 -2860.9
Table 4: Transitions originating in temporary employment. Piecewise-constant
hazard model with random effects. The model also includes 10 time dummies.
tion (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employed worker believes that his or her
qualiﬁcations exceed those necessary at his or her current position) are positively
and signiﬁcantly associated with search eﬀorts.
7 Conclusions
Fixed-term contracts are, by design, associated with more transitions out of em-
ployment to all destination states. The results in the employment to unemploy-
ment and employment to inactivity equations could indicate that ﬁxed-term con-
tracts are dead-end jobs. However, in a previous paper, we found that employers
use ﬁxed-term contracts essentially for screening workers for permanent positions.
We argue that the contradiction is only apparent. More transitions from ﬁxed-
term contracts to other jobs or non-employment status is not contradictory with
these contracts being used as mechanisms of search by employers and workers.
17estimate std error mg eﬀect
Sex 0.0283 0.0451 0.0006
Schooling 0.0355* 0.0061 0.0007
Training 0.2201* 0.0606 0.0056
Experience -0.0022 0.0018 -0.00004
Tenure -0.0036* 0.0004 -0.0001
First Job -0.1150** 0.0540 -0.0019
FTC 0.2294* 0.0481 0.0059
Part-time 0.6755* 0.0697 0.0300
Unusual Hours 0.0546 0.0441 0.0011
Hourly wage (log) -0.4076* 0.0567 -0.0078
Overeducation 0.5643* 0.0609 0.0219
Type of Employer
Public Administration 0.0277 0.0684 0,0005




Table 5: On-the-job Search Behaviour. Probit results
The survival rate of newly-formed matches is endogenous to the amount of
pre-hiring search eﬀort. From the standpoint of ﬁrms, the availability of low
termination costs contracts may stimulate less pre-hiring screening and thereby
reduce the proportion of new temporary matches that become permanent.
The quarterly rate of transition from a temporary to a regular job indicates
that a non-trivial share of all ﬁxed-term contracts eventually becomes permanent.
This result unequivocally means screening. In this context, ﬁxed-term contracts
become stepping-stones to regular forms of employment.
The age-earnings proﬁle of workers with ﬁxed-term and regular contracts com-
pared indicates that temporary employment is costly for older workers with more
cumulated labor market experience if, for some reason (e.g., job loss due to plant
closings), they lose their regular jobs. Temporary employment implies the loss of
returns to experience, and age reduces the probability of obtaining a new job.
A particularly strong result indicates that, over the life-cycle, workers with
ﬁxed-term contracts receive lower returns to both experience and tenure.
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